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The status of singular things in Spinoza’s Ethics: essences and existences
Yukihiko FUJINO
 According to Spinoza, “particular things are nothing but affections of God’s attributes, 
or modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way” 
(E1P25C). As per his definition, mode is “the affections of a substance, or that which is 
in another through which it is also conceived” (E1Def4). This means that he understands 
things, for example, the human body, as a kind of affection of God, the absolute substance. 
Then, how can we call things deprived of the status of substance “singular things”? In other 
words, how can we say that there are singular things?
 In Spinoza’s metaphysics, existences are conceived in two species; Duration and 
Eternity. That is concerned with time and space, and this is with necessity in the production 
from God’s nature. To answer the above question, the status of singular things in both 
species should be examined .
 With regard to duration, the essences of things are understood in a fixed manner 
in which subordinate things, ultimately the simplest bodies, communicate through their 
own motions. We can see that this essence of things, which Spinoza calls “actual”, is not 
distinguished from the actual (temporal) existence of the singular thing in question.
 However, in the species of eternity―though Spinoza says that the formal essences 
of things are comprehended in God’s attributes―cognition about things never extends 
to their singularities. So, in this case, should we conclude that singular things lose their 
singularities? My answer is no―the impossibility of cognition of singularities is not 
necessarily tantamount to the absence of singularity itself. Rather, Spinoza seems to have 
built a system that places the singularity of things at the base.
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